April 16, 2003

WITH BAGHDAD HAVING fallen and the end of the war to secure the rest of Iraq drawing near, the attention of the world has shifted to the postwar order. How Iraq is governed and rebuilt in the first two years following the war's conclusion may determine whether, in the rhetoric of the Bush administration, it is transformed into a beacon of democracy for the Arab world – or, as many Middle East experts fear, it sparks a wave of violent and destabilizing unrest in the region.

The global debate on this issue has focused on two approaches or models for postwar Iraq: the United Nations model, predicated on the notion that the U.N. should assume a leadership role in the postwar reconstruction and democratization process, and the Pentagon model, which envisages a postwar dispensation installed and facilitated by a U.S. military occupation.

While the former has received the endorsement of the majority of the international community and Iraqi exile leaders, the latter reflects the narrow vision of a small cabal of U.S. neoconservatives led by deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz. With the Pentagon having hijacked the postwar planning process, a role historically reserved for the U.S. State Department and civilian relief agencies, it appears increasingly likely that their postwar vision will be realized.

The implementation of such an approach, based on erroneous assumptions and analysis, will have grave consequences for the future of Iraq, the region, and international security.

Occupying Iraq would be unwise and untenable for several reasons. First, the war has illustrated that while a large proportion of the Iraqi populace may detest Saddam Hussein, a U.S. protectorate is no more palatable. The jubilation of the Iraqi people in the initial aftermath of the fall of the Baghdad, marked by poignant images of Iraqis celebrating atop the ruined symbols of the Baathist regime, should not be misinterpreted as an endorsement of a continued U.S. presence. Once the reality of occupation sets in, the euphoric mood of the Iraqi people will shift to suspicion and hostility.

Second, an occupation will be viewed by the Arab world as a new U.S. imperium in the region that will intensify anti-American sentiment and support for extremist groups.

Third, the economic cost of rebuilding Iraq, estimated at more than $25 billion a year, may become prohibitive in the long term. Contrary to the assurances of U.S. officials, Iraqi oil revenue will cover only a fraction of the costs associated with the country's reconstruction. Iraq will require an aid program as ambitious as the Marshall Plan to recover from two wars and 12 years of sanctions. With major donors such as the European Union reluctant to contribute to a reconstruction process that marginalizes the U.N., it appears the bulk of the burden for this program will fall on the shoulders of the U.S. taxpayer.

Lastly, the U.S. military is ill prepared to direct a humanitarian operation of the magnitude required in Iraq without the support of civilian aid agencies. This support will not be forthcoming, as prominent nongovernmental organizations and U.N. agencies have affirmed that they will not serve as subcontractors to the U.S. military.